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Do Firms Demand Temporary Workers When They Face Workload Fluctuation? Cross-
Country Firm-Level Evidence 
Vanessa Dräger and Paul Marx∗ 
 
[[abstract]] The growth of temporary employment is one of the most important transformations 
of labor markets in the past decades. Theoretically, firms’ exposure to short-term workload 
fluctuations is a major determinant of employing temporary workers when employment 
protection for permanent workers is high. The authors investigate this relationship empirically 
with establishment-level data in a broad comparative framework. They create two novel data sets 
by merging 1) data on 18,500 European firms with 2) measures of labor-market institutions for 
20 countries. Results show that fluctuations increase the probability of hiring temporary workers 
by 8 percentage points in countries with strict employment protection laws. No such effect is 
observed in countries with weaker employment protections. Results are robust to subgroups, 
subsamples, and alternative estimation strategies. 
 
Temporary employment accounts for a considerable share of the European Union (EU-27) 
workforce—approximately 14%, 60% of which is involuntary (Eurostat 2012). Workers on 
temporary contracts are one of the groups most vulnerable to economic downturns (Boeri 2011: 
1207), which implies a large risk of incurring losses in well-being (Frey and Stutzer 2002; Lucas 
2007). Moreover, temporary employment comes with fewer training opportunities, lower wages, 
and higher job insecurity compared to permanent employment (Booth, Francesconi, and Frank 
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2002; De Cuyper, de Jong, De Witte, and Schalk 2008). Hence, gaining deeper insights into the 
mechanisms that generate temporary employment is relevant for policymaking. 
This article contributes to such insights by studying firms’1 demand for temporary 
workers in various institutional contexts. Studying the firm level is important for two reasons: 
first, firms’ workload fluctuations are a main reason for the use of temporary workers 
(Houseman 2001; Morikawa 2010; Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler, and Kugler 2014). Second, 
firm-level workload fluctuations are positively related to macroeconomic business cycle 
volatilities (Buch, Döpke, and Stahn 2008). Hence, recent increases in macroeconomic 
volatilities caused by the economic crisis in many European countries might have increased 
fluctuations on the firm level. As a result, the propensity of firms to employ temporary workers 
might have increased.  
Firm-level workload fluctuations do not determine the use of temporary employment in 
isolation, however. Research shows that the institutional context also matters, particularly 
employment protection legislation for permanent workers (EPLP) (Bentolila and Saint-Paul 
1992; Houseman 2001; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay 2002; Boeri and Garibaldi 2007; Kahn 2010; 
Centeno and Novo 2012; Hijzen, Mondauto, and Scarpetta 2013; Eslava et al. 2014). Moreover, 
research has shown that real shocks interact with institutions in determining the extent of 
temporary employment (Bentolila and Saint-Paul 1992; Nunziata and Staffolani 2007; Eslava et 
al. 2014). 
Building on this literature, we ask: Is the effect of workload fluctuations on firms’ 
decision to employ temporary workers stronger in countries that impose strict rules on the 
dismissal of permanent workers? Based on a recent search-and-matching model by Cahuc, 
Charlot, and Malherbet (2012), we expect that firms are more likely to employ temporary 
workers if they face a high shock arrival rate, that is, if they expect jobs to have only a short 
duration. The extent of this effect depends on sufficiently high employment protection for 
permanent workers. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first comparative study to 
investigate how heterogeneity in the expected duration of jobs and labor market institutions 
jointly affect the firms’ decision to employ temporary workers. 
                                                
1 We employ firms and establishments interchangeably. Thereby, we assume that in firms with 
more than one establishment, these establishments operate independently when it comes to 
employment decisions. 
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Our contribution is threefold: First, in contrast to Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992), 
Nunziata and Staffolani (2007), and Eslava et al. (2014), we use a measure of shocks that is more 
closely related to the theoretical model by Cahuc et al. (2012). This model emphasizes 
heterogeneity in expected shock arrival rates, which is captured by our measure of workload 
fluctuation. Hence, we are the first to empirically test the theoretical argument made by Cahuc et 
al. (2012). Second, in contrast to Nunziata and Staffolani (2007), who used macro-data, we add a 
micro-perspective. By combining institutional data with establishment-level data we are, for 
instance, better able to account for composition effects. Third, we add a broad cross-country 
perspective, whereas Eslava et al. (2014) and Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) used firm-level 
data. This approach enables us to exploit variation in institutional context. 
Our empirical strategy uses novel data from two waves of the European Company Survey 
(with approximately 18,000 establishments each) clustered in up to 20 European countries. We 
merge this information with macro-level variables, most notably on variation in employment 
protection legislation (Boeri and Jimeno 2005). Although the cross-sectional character clearly 
limits our analyses, the broad international scope offers a unique opportunity to analyze firms’ 
hiring decisions in a variety of institutional contexts. 
We estimate a binary choice model with the pooled data set and use clustered standard 
errors as well as country dummies to account for autocorrelation (resulting from clustering and 
unobserved heterogeneity at the country level). We find that establishments facing workload 
fluctuations within a year in flexible regimes are not more likely to employ temporary workers 
compared to establishments without workload fluctuations. In countries with a sufficiently high 
level of employment protection legislation (EPL), however, establishments are significantly 
more likely to employ temporary workers (78% compared with 70%). This outcome is the same 
for the subgroups of temporary agency and fixed-term contract workers. Our results are robust if 
we account for differential enforcement of employment protection. They are also robust across 
different country subsamples, years of observation, estimation strategies, and model 
specifications. 
We begin with our theoretical argument based on labor demand and search-and-matching 
models. From there, we derive our reduced-form empirical labor demand model and discuss the 
empirical strategy. After describing data sources and central concepts, we present our results and 
discuss endogeneity as well as robustness issues. 
4 
[[h1 (level one subhead)]]Theory and Empirical Literature 
European labor markets are characterized by heterogeneous employment protection for 
permanent and temporary workers. These are typically presented as either dynamic labor demand 
models under uncertainty (e.g., Bentolila and Saint-Paul 1992; Hamermesh 1996; Boeri and 
Garibaldi 2007; Nunziata and Staffolani 2007)2 or search-and-matching models (e.g., Blanchard 
and Landier 2002; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay 2002; Bentolila, Cahuc, Dolado, and Le 
Barbanchon2010). Most theoretical models, however, analyze the impact of two-tier labor 
market reforms (i.e., a partial deregulation of temporary contracts only) on macroeconomic 
outcomes such as employment or unemployment rates (e.g., Boeri and Garibaldi 2007). The 
impact of employment protection on the distribution of permanent and temporary jobs is often 
neglected. Nunziata and Staffolani (2007) are an important exception. In a dynamic labor 
demand model, they predicted that an increase or decrease of temporary employment depends on 
the state of the economy and on the constraints in employing permanent workers. 
As Berton and Garibaldi (2006) noted, the literature on two-tier labor market reforms in 
rigid labor markets often assumes (or implies) that after partial deregulation, firms rely on 
temporary employment exclusively when filling vacancies. It is more realistic, however, to 
assume a continuing coexistence of permanent and temporary contracts. For employers, the 
choice between contract types entails a trade-off: permanent contracts may exhibit a higher job-
filling rate, but temporary contracts provide flexibility in case of productivity shocks (Berton and 
Garibaldi 2006). If at least some employers continue to hire permanently,3 the important question 
becomes what determines employers’ choice between permanent and temporary employment 
contracts. 
Cahuc et al. (2012) and Eslava et al. (2014) explicitly modeled the choice between 
contract types. Cahuc et al. (2012: 2) pointed to the relevance of the “heterogeneity of expected 
duration of jobs” for this choice. In this article, we are interested in this aspect, specifically. 
Other search-and-matching models or labor demand models include stochastic shocks modeled, 
for instance, as Geometric Brownian motion (Lotti and Viviano 2012), but not heterogeneity in 
                                                
2 Labor demand models with heterogeneous workers are often based on the classical labor 
demand model and firing costs with one type of worker, by Bentolila and Bertola (1990). 
3 C In some contributions the stock of permanent contracts is not necessarily completely 
crowded-out over timebecause they allow for the conversion of temporary contracts into 
permanent contracts (e.g., Blanchard and Landier 2002; Nunziata and Staffolani 2007).. 
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the expected duration of jobs. Intuitively, the choice of employment contracts is most likely 
based on expectations about the durability of production opportunities. Permanent contracts are 
associated with dismissal costs, whereas temporary contracts can be terminated (after a 
predetermined duration) at no cost. If dismissal protection imposes sufficiently high turnover 
costs on permanent workers, and if employers expect that the task a worker performs is limited 
in time, a temporary contract is chosen. If employment protection is low for permanent workers, 
permanent contracts are always chosen—even for jobs with an expected short duration. Hence, 
dismissal costs and the probability of a worker becoming unproductive (the job’s shock arrival 
rate) interact in determining the choice of employment contracts. 
The theoretical models on the use of temporary work point to the paramount importance 
of firm and job characteristics in interaction with institutional features determining firing costs. 
Taking the view of the firm (and leaving workers’ decisions aside),4 we formulate the following 
hypothesis for the choice between temporary and permanent contracts: firms’ propensity to offer 
temporary contracts increases with the probability that jobs within the firm become 
unproductive, conditional upon sufficiently high adjustment costs for permanent workers.  
Empirical research analyzing this specific interaction at the firm level in a cross-country 
design does not exist, but empirical studies have shown that firing costs are important for the 
impact of shocks on the workforce. First, single-country firm-level studies show that workload 
fluctuations influence firms’ decision whether to (at least partially) hire on temporary contracts 
(Boockmann and Hagen 2001; Houseman 2001) as well as the size of the workforce (Bentolila 
and Saint-Paul 1992). These findings are in line with Cahuc et al. (2012), who showed that 
workers become unproductive with production opportunities of differing lengths. Second, in the 
vein of Cahuc et al. (2012), studies have shown that firing costs are relevant for the effect of 
fluctuations or cyclical elements on employment. For instance, Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) 
showed that for Spain in the 1980s, firm-level cyclical elasticity to sales increased with the 
availability of temporary contracts. At the aggregated level, Nunziata and Staffolani (2007) 
found that temporary employment rates vary more strongly over the business cycle than do 
permanent employment rates, and that this cyclical response is even stronger if temporary agency 
                                                
4 As most temporary contracts are involuntary, we expect firms to be the more powerful actor in 
the bargaining process, and hence we focus on modeling their behavior. In the EU-27, 60.4% of 
temporary workers preferred a permanent job over a temporary job in 2009 (Eurostat 2012). 
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workers are well protected. The cyclical elasticity of temporary employment changes only to a 
minor extent with protection for permanent workers at the aggregated level, however. Eslava et 
al. (2014) showed that when Colombian firms created (destroyed) jobs, the share of temporary 
workers increased (decreased). They also showed that this relationship became stronger when 
dismissal costs for permanent workers increased after 2001. Although these studies are strongly 
related to ours, we add a broad cross-country perspective (in contrast to Eslava et al. [2014] and 
Bentolila and Saint-Paul [1992]), the firm-level (in contrast to Nunziata and Staffolani [2007]), 
and the measurement of heterogeneous shock arrival rates (in contrast to all three). 
To assess our theoretical hypotheses, we ideally require the combination of institutional 
variables (firing costs) and firm-level variables (firm-specific shock arrival rates).5 Alternatively, 
cross-country or within-country variation could be exploited (Boeri and Jimeno 2005). Within-
country variance is relatively small, however. Employment protection legislation is highly path-
dependent, particularly for permanent workers. Variable enforcement of employment protection 
by firm size offers some, but rather limited, within-country variation. Aggregated (national) data, 
by contrast, disguises heterogeneity in shock arrival rates across sectors and firms. Hence, to 
account empirically for both institutional differences and heterogeneity in expected job duration, 
one would ideally employ comparative firm-level data. We meet these requirements for 
European firms by employing a relatively new data set. 
[[h1]]Empirical Specification 
Our hypothesis is that a firm’s propensity to use temporary contracts is high if the job is expected 
to be of a relatively short duration and if employment protection for permanent workers is high. 
To link our theoretical argument to a reduced-form empirical labor demand model, we make 
simplifying arguments that are driven partly by pragmatic reasons and partly by data availability 
(as discussed later). The propensity to use temporary contracts is best measured with flow data 
(the composition of hiring), and the probability of a job becoming unproductive refers to job-
specific characteristics (which can differ within firms). Ideally, therefore, we would have linked 
employer–employee data, but such data are difficult to obtain in a comparative framework. 
                                                
5 Theoretically, the shock arrival rate is specific to jobs not to firms, because temporary and 
permanent workers coexist in many firms. As we argue below, however, characteristics 
determining choice of employment contract are easier to observe at the firm level than at the 
level of specific jobs. Estimating job-specific shock arrival rates would require comparable 
linked employer–employee data. 
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Hence, in our main analyses we use a binary dependent variable taking the value of 1 if 
establishments employ at least one temporary worker. In additional analyses, we use the 
composition of the stock of employees by contract type. To measure the shock arrival rate, we 
employ workload fluctuations over different periods. Finally, adjustment costs are strongly 
influenced by employment protection legislation for permanent workers at the national level. 
This fact allows us to rephrase our hypothesis as follows: firms’ likelihood of having temporary 
workers in their workforce is higher, ceteris paribus, if the firm is exposed to workload 
fluctuations, but only if the costs for dismissal of permanent workers (as stipulated by law or 
collective agreement) are sufficiently high. 
In our baseline specification, we assume that the profit of employing at least one 
temporary worker for firm i in country j can be characterized by a latent variable : 
 
with  
 
 
and with employment protection legislation for permanent workers EPLPj, short-term workload 
fluctuation WFij, a vector of controls C, and the error term components Rij and Uj.  
At least one temporary worker is in the workforce of a firm (yij = 1) if the profit of 
employing the worker exceeds the threshold c. We replace the dependent variable by the two 
subgroups, fixed-term contract (FTC) and temporary agency workers (TAW), to which our 
theoretical argument applies similarly. We extend the analysis by using the percentage of fixed-
term contract workers at the date of the interview as a dependent variable. We estimate a two-
component model, taking account of corner solutions and different processes for the intensive 
and extensive margin (Cameron and Trivedi 2009: 538ff.; Eslava et al. 2014). 
The main variable of interest is the effect of WFij in different institutional contexts 
(employment protection legislation for permanent workers [EPLP]) on the propensity that a firm 
employs temporary workers. For this, we require variation on the institutional level. As 
mentioned above, the options are within- and between-country variance (Boeri and Jimeno 
2005). Because of data limitations, we are restricted to variation of EPLP across countries rather 
than within countries. 
ijy *
ij 0 1 j ij 2 ij 3y * EPLP *WF  WF ij jR Uβ β β= + + + + +β C
ij ijy  1 if y * c,= >
ijy  0 otherwise=
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Concerning our estimation strategy, we assume that the firm-specific error component Rij 
is i.i.d. and logistically distributed. Because firms are clustered within countries, however, the 
error terms might be correlated within countries. Furthermore, there might be unobservables at 
the country level that are correlated with other covariates, which would yield biased estimates. 
We tackle these issues by clustering the standard errors at the country level in all models and by 
including country fixed effects in some models.6 We define the models at the end of this section. 
For robustness checks, we estimate models that correct for clustering but not for unobserved 
heterogeneity at the country level. The results are robust with regard to WFij and EPLPj*WFij. 
Furthermore, we estimate different specifications, for example, subsample models. Overall, the 
results are quite robust, in particular with regard to fluctuations within a year. 
The vector C includes several controls on the firm level, such as firm size and industry, 
as well as country-level variables and country dummies (depending on the specification). For the 
firm level, some researchers have argued that workplace representation may have an impact on 
the use of temporary jobs (Salvatori 2009). Empirical results are ambiguous, though, and the 
direction of the effect of workplace representation is theoretically unclear (Bentolila and Dolado 
1994; Böheim and Zweimüller 2009). First, given that works councils are not at the core of our 
argument, we refrain from making an explicit theoretical claim, but we include a control dummy 
taking the value of 1 if workplace representation is present in the establishment. Second, 
Houseman (2001) found in a company survey that temporary workers are employed to fill 
positions of absent regular workers or to screen candidates for vacancies. We therefore control 
for the rates of absent workers and new workers (the latter is measured as an increased number 
of workers). Third, in empirical labor demand models, labor costs, costs of intermediate goods, 
capital stocks, and performance indicators are usually controlled for (Bentolila and Saint-Paul 
1992). Some of these aspects are captured by including the change in the number of employees. 
For the others, we control indirectly by firm size and economic sector. Fourth, we control for the 
rate of female and high-skilled employees in the workforce, because these groups differ in their 
likelihood of holding temporary contracts (Kahn 2007). Finally, we control for whether the firm 
                                                
6 Because clustered data are generally short-panel data with within-individual clustering 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2009: 307ff), one can employ panel methods (random effects and fixed 
effects) to deal with the clustering. Clustering can also be dealt with by cluster-robust standard 
errors (ibid.: 306). The random effects model is also referred to as a type of “multilevel model” 
(Snijders and Bosker 1999; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). 
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makes use of flexible working time, because such arrangements might serve as a functionally 
equivalent way to cope with fluctuation. 
Depending on whether we include country dummies, we also include control variables at 
the country level. First, authors have argued in the literature that wage rigidity exacerbates the 
effect of EPL, since higher turnover costs cannot be compensated for by lower wage costs 
(Lazear 1990). Empirical studies on wage rigidity found that downward real wage rigidity 
depends on labor market institutions such as collective bargaining (Babecký et al. 2010). 
Therefore, we include the proportion of eligible workers covered by collective agreements 
(collective bargaining coverage rate) in our model (singly and interacted with EPL for permanent 
and temporary workers, as well as interacted with annual workload fluctuations). The data are 
obtained from Hayter and Stoevska (2011) and Eurofound (2007). Second, high EPLP often goes 
hand-in-hand with low EPL for temporary workers, and low EPL for temporary workers 
increases the probability of being a temporary worker (Kahn 2010). Therefore, we control for 
EPL for temporary workers and its interaction with annual workload fluctuation, as well as its 
interaction with EPLP. Finally, we control for the national unemployment rate in the first quarter 
of 2009 (as provided by Eurostat) to control for higher pressure for job seekers to accept 
temporary jobs (Polavieja 2005). 
We define two models, to which we refer in the following analyses. Model (1) allows for 
unobserved country fixed effects by including country dummies. By contrast, Model (2) 
explicitly models the country-level variables that were shown to be relevant for temporary 
employment. For this reason, Model (2) is more directly related to the theoretical and empirical 
research on temporary employment. Model (1) and Model (2) both control for the above-
mentioned establishment controls, as well as for interactions between annual workload 
fluctuation and country-level variables.7 Standard errors are clustered at the country level in both 
models. 
[[h1]]Stylized Facts and Data Sources 
We utilize establishment-level data from approximately 18,000 establishments in up to 20 
European countries for two years and merge them with country-level data. The European 
Company Survey (ECS) provides our data on the establishment level (Eurofound 2006, 2010b; 
                                                
7 Model (1) is robust to different covariates at the establishment level, such as excluding firm 
size and sector dummies. Results are available from the authors upon request. 
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Gensicke, Hajek, and Tschersich 2009).8 The ECS (formerly the Establishment Survey on 
Working Time [ESWT]) started in 2004–2005 and is comparable across countries.9 The survey is 
repeated every four years. Our analysis mainly focuses on the most recent wave collected in 
spring 2009, but we provide robustness analyses with data collected between autumn 2004 and 
spring 2005.10 The 2004–2005 and the 2009 ECS are representative for establishments with more 
than 10 employees.11 
The original 2009 ECS comprises approximately 27,000 establishments from 30 
European countries. A considerable number of countries had to be excluded because of missing 
data on either the micro-level or the institutional level. Since the loss of countries and 
observations is considerable, we provide a description of the original sample, as well as the 
reason for dropping certain countries in Appendix C. The final 2009 sample comprises 20 
European countries and 18,407 establishments. In the original 2004–2005 ECS, 21,031 
establishments from 21 European countries participated. Our final sample comprises 17 countries 
and 17,923 establishments. 
To our knowledge, only one data source on the establishment level is comparable with 
the ECS in its broad coverage and details on contract types—the purely cross-sectional firm 
survey of the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) (Bertola et al. 2012). The WDN covers 14 
countries and 15,235 responses. The ECS, to its advantage, utilizes a larger sample of countries 
and establishments. A second advantage is that the unit of observation is establishments. These 
advantages provide us with a more disaggregated perspective and a broader sample. Other firm-
                                                
8 The unit of observation in the ECS is the establishment. Establishments are local production 
sites, and firms may consist of multiple local production sites. 
9 Comparability across countries for the ECS 2009 is strong regarding questionnaire translation 
and the fieldwork period, but the sampling frame differs slightly for large firms in Belgium, 
Denmark, Greece, France, Luxembourg, Hungary, Poland, and Turkey (Eurofound 2011). 
10 Unfortunately, data for 2013 were not available at the time of writing this article. 
11 The unit of the interviews for the 2009 ECS was the establishment. In the case of multisite 
firms, one of the establishments was randomly selected. The sampling was conducted on the 
basis of a 10-cell matrix (size and sector). Large firms were overrepresented in order to have a 
sufficiently large number of those firms. Employing country-specific employer weights, our 
descriptives correct for this. The survey covers all relevant sectors from the Statistical 
Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE [Rev. 1.1]), excluding 
sectors A (agriculture, hunting, forestry), B (fishing), P (private household with employed 
persons), and Q (extra-territorial organisations and bodies).The latter two sectors are both of 
negligible size (Eurofound 2010a: 3). 
11 
level databases, such as Amadeus, cover a broad sample, but variables on the composition of the 
workforce are not available. One possible limitation of the ECS is that the sampling procedure 
excludes agriculture and forestry. These sectors experience major seasonal fluctuation, which is 
one of our main variables. But, as these sectors are small in most countries, we do not believe 
their absence unduly biases our results. 
[[h2]]Establishment-Level Variables 
The ECS asks separately whether temporary agency workers or fixed-term workers were 
employed within the past 12 months by the establishment, that is, between spring 2008 and 
spring 2009 (between autumn 2003 and spring 2005 in 2004–2005 sample). Temporary agency 
workers (TAWs) are employed by an agency and sent on temporary assignments to user firms. 
As an alternative, establishments can employ workers directly on fixed-term contracts (FTCs). In 
this case, the establishment has a contract with the worker. We code a dummy variable Temp, 
which is 1 if the establishment employs at least one FTC or TAW, and 0 otherwise. 
In addition, the 2009 survey includes the proportion of employees holding an FTC in the 
establishment.12 The question asked is: “About what proportion of your employees is holding a 
fixed-term contract?” For a number of reasons we do not expect the mediating role of EPLP to 
be as clear as for the binary variable. First, the variable on the share of FTCs refers to the date of 
the interview, but our main explanatory variable (annual workload fluctuation) does not provide 
any information on the workload at the date of the interview. Because of this inconsistency in 
the time frame, it might be that the survey in many cases misses the production peaks during 
which temporary workers are employed. Second, our main explanatory variable is also binary 
(see below) and thus less suitable for predicting precise shares of FTCs in an establishment. 
Predicting the share of FTCs would require information on the intensity of fluctuations, which 
we do not have. Third, data were collected in spring 2009, a period during which most countries 
in our sample experienced a severe economic crisis. The precise share of FTCs is arguably more 
sensitive to asymmetric adjustments of staff levels in the crisis than it is to the binary variable. 
As mentioned earlier, the wording of the question from which our binary dependent variable 
derives refers to the entire previous year rather than merely to the time of the interview. 
Therefore, the binary variable should be less affected by the crisis (Eurofound 2010a: 2). 
[[Table 1 about here]] 
                                                
12 Unfortunately, the share of FTCs is not available for the 2004–2005 sample. 
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The descriptives for both variables are shown in Table 1. In our sample, approximately 
61% of the establishments use temporary contracts. Usage varies from 27% in Slovakia to almost 
85% in the Netherlands (Figure 1). Around 53% of establishments employ FTCs, but only 22% 
use TAWs. This result corresponds with the observation that TAWs have only a minor share in 
the total workforce (less than 2% in most included countries), whereas FTCs are more prevalent. 
Hence, FTCs clearly have a stronger influence on our results. The average share of FTCs on the 
establishment level (including establishments without any such contracts) is 10%, ranging from 
2.7% in Austria to 19% in Poland. 
[[Figure 1 about here]] 
According to our theoretical argument, firms expecting a short duration of jobs should 
anticipate that some workers will become unproductive and thus hire (partly) on temporary 
contracts. Hence, we need a proxy variable for expected shock arrival rates. Shocks in labor 
demand models are usually modeled as stochastic processes with a specific degree of uncertainty 
(e.g., Geometric Brownian motion). Some empirical work or calibrations focus on the uncertain 
part of these shocks, such as in Lotti and Viviano (2012) (squared difference of upper and lower 
bound of expected output), or in Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1994) (variance parameter in a 
model). A major part of the empirical work approximates shocks in labor demand models by real 
shocks, such as in Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) (change in sales) or in Nunziata and Staffolani 
(2007) (Hodrick-Prescott-Filter–based GDP recession measure). 
To analyze our hypotheses, we need information on heterogeneity in expected shock 
arrival rates across firms. The ECS contains an item on workload fluctuation that captures this 
concept fairly well. The survey asks: “Does your establishment normally have to cope with 
major variations of the workload . . . 1) within a day, 2) within a week or 3) within a year?” This 
variable provides information on whether firms expect to have to cope with shocks, but we do 
not have any information on the current state of the firm. This measurement is more closely 
related to real shocks, rather than a proxy for uncertainty (variances in the expected shocks). 
We include all three variables as dummies in the model. FTC and TAW should be more 
affected by fluctuations within a year than by fluctuations within days and weeks. TAW might be 
a little more important for weekly fluctuation, because establishments can obtain staff at short 
notice (the typical recruitment procedures for FTCs do not allow being responsive to unforeseen 
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weekly fluctuations). Fluctuations within a week or a day, however, can be dealt with mostly by 
hiring part-time workers or by relying on flexible working time. 
[[Figure 2 about here]] 
Figure 2 shows that workload variations within a year are the dominant form of 
fluctuations in most countries. In our sample, 64% of the establishments have to deal with such 
fluctuations (ranging from 42% in Turkey to 76% in Finland). Yearly fluctuations are 
particularly strong in sectors that have to deal with seasonal variations, such as hotels and 
restaurants; construction; or community, social, and personal services. They are less relevant in 
sectors with a constant workload, such as health, social work, education, and manufacturing and 
energy. In countries with low shares of establishments facing yearly fluctuation, such as Turkey 
and Slovakia, more establishments are active in the manufacturing and energy sectors. For 
instance, in Turkey the textile industry plays a crucial role, and textile production is probably 
less affected by seasonal fluctuation. By contrast, other community, social, and personal services 
play a stronger role in countries that have experienced a stronger shift toward a postindustrial 
labor market (e.g., Finland and Germany). 
[[h2]]Country-Level Variables 
The effect of fluctuation on the likelihood of employing temporary contracts should be 
conditional on sufficiently high firing costs for permanent workers. Hence, we need data on 
firing costs for permanent workers. For this purpose, we use the well-established OECD 
indicator on the strictness of EPL for 2004 and 2008 (Venn 2009).13 The indicator has various 
subcomponents measuring how strictly different contract types are regulated. In our case, the 
main important indicator is the sub-indicator for dismissal of employees on permanent contracts 
(EPLP). We also include the sub-indicator for the strictness of regulation of temporary contracts 
(EPL Temp). This additional indicator is necessary because it has been shown to interact with the 
regulation of permanent contracts (Nunziata and Staffolani 2007). We expect the effect of 
institutions to be dominated by regulation of permanent contracts, however. In this context, note 
that the values of EPLP and EPL Temp are not directly comparable because they measure 
entirely different phenomena. To be clear, similar values on EPLP and EPL Temp do not 
                                                
13 Bentolila et al. (2010) criticized the OECD indicator for Spain for being too high for 
regulations on temporary contracts and too lax for regulations on permanent contracts. To the 
best of our knowledge though, this indicator is the best known and most commonly employed for 
comparative studies. 
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indicate similar adjustment costs for both types of workers. Even if temporary contracts are 
strictly regulated by comparison, they are usually still more flexible than permanent contracts. 
Hence, irrespective of their level of regulation, temporary contracts should be attractive if firing 
costs for permanent workers are high (see Kramarz and Michaud [2010] for a similar argument). 
The OECD sub-indicator for EPL Temp is an aggregate of two sub-sub-indicators: EPL 
for fixed-term contracts (EPL FTC) and EPL for agency workers (EPL TAW). EPL FTC 
includes, for instance, measures on the maximum number of successive contracts and cumulated 
duration. EPL TAW includes information such as equal treatment legislation, maximum 
cumulated duration, and types of work for which TAW is permitted.  
[[Figure 3 about here]] 
[[Table 2 about here]] 
The 2008 OECD indicators EPLP and EPL Temp are shown in Figure 3 and Table 2. 
Typically, permanent contracts in southern European countries, such as Portugal, are relatively 
strongly regulated (with 3.51 in EPLP and 1.147 in centered EPLP), whereas Ireland and the 
United Kingdom have more flexible regulation (with 1.17 in EPLP and –1.193 in centered EPLP 
for the United Kingdom). High EPL Temp means that regulation of temporary employment is 
rather restrictive. Countries with low restrictions are again the United Kingdom and Ireland. 
Some countries with high EPLP decreased EPL Temp to make their labor markets more flexible. 
Dual labor markets are characterized by strict EPLP and lenient EPL Temp. EPL FTC is lowest 
in Slovakia and highest in Greece, and EPL TAW is lowest in United Kingdom and highest in 
Turkey. 
[[h1]]Empirical Results 
[[h2]]Workload Fluctuation and Temporary Contracts 
[[h3]]Temporary Workers 
Theoretically, we expect establishments facing workload fluctuations to be more likely than 
establishments without workload fluctions to hire temporary workers. This effect, however, 
should be conditional on sufficiently high EPLP. The results presented in Table 3 largely 
confirm this hypothesis for our binary choice model.14  
                                                
14 The full model is presented in Appendix Table A.1. Results are robust to the use of employer 
weights (Appendix Figure B.1). 
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Table 3 presents the two models for our binary dependent variable with Model (1) in 
column (1) and Model (2) in column (2). The coefficients of annual workload fluctuation and of 
the interaction between annual workload fluctuation and EPLP are both quite robust across the 
two models. In columns (1) and (2), annual fluctuation is significantly and positively related to 
the decision of employing at least one temporary worker. Also, the magnitude is rather similar: 
For establishments with annual fluctuations, the odds of using temporary workers are 33% higher 
in column (1) and 32% higher in column (2). Given these similarities, we do not expect that the 
estimate on workload fluctuation in column (2) captures much unobserved heterogeneity at the 
country level. We also observe in both columns that the odds increase with higher EPLP. 
EPLP*WF annual is positive and statistically significant, although the effect is smaller in column 
(1). In sum, Model (1) (which accounts for unobserved heterogeneity at the country level) and 
Model (2) do not differ substantially. In the following we focus on Model (2), which we consider 
more directly related to the theoretical and empirical literature on temporary employment.  
[[Table 3 about here]] 
The results for annual fluctuations (if EPLP is held constant at the mean) provide strong 
support for the argument that fluctuations are a main motive for establishments to employ 
temporary workers (Bentolila and Saint-Paul 1992; Boockman and Hagen 2001; Houseman 
2001). In line with our argument, the odds ratio is even higher when EPLP increases by one unit 
(1.69).15 
As expected, other types of fluctuation have little or no effect on the likelihood of 
employing temporary workers. Although annual fluctuation is robust, this is not true for weekly 
and daily fluctuation. The lack of robustness is also revealed in subsample estimations and 
individual country regressions, which find robust positive coefficients for annual fluctuation but 
not for daily and weekly fluctuation. This finding is in line with the argument that establishments 
adjust for weekly and daily fluctuations by using part-time workers or working time accounts. 
To present the substantive effect of our explanatory variables, Figure 4 plots average 
predicted probabilities of employing at least one temporary worker over different values of 
                                                
15 This interpretation is corroborated by the average marginal effects depicted in Figures 5 and 6. 
Presented in odds ratios, the interaction term in this model tells us by how much the effect 
differs, although it does so in a multiplicative way (Buis 2010: 307). Hence, the relevant odds 
ratio for annual fluctuation is obtained by multiplying its odds ratios with the coefficient of the 
interaction term (Buis 2010). 
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EPLP, broken down by establishments with and without annual fluctuations.16 These predicted 
probabilities are based on column (2) in Table 3. The predicted probabilities confirm that the gap 
between the two types of establishments increases with strictness of EPLP and that this gap is 
substantively relevant. In a flexible regime such as the United Kingdom (with –1.193 in centered 
EPLP), establishments employ temporary workers with a probability of 59% and the 
establishment types do not differ (calculated at –1.1 in centered EPLP). In rigid regimes such as 
Portugal (with 1.147 in centered EPLP), the probability of employing temporary workers is 78% 
for establishments with annual fluctuations, compared to 70% for those without fluctuations 
(calculated at 1.2 in centered EPLP). 
[[Figure 4 about here]] 
To determine if the differences between the two types of establishments are significant, 
we calculate the average marginal effects of annual workload fluctuation on the probability of 
employing at least one temporary worker at different values of EPL for permanent workers and 
at the mean of the other interaction terms, as well as their confidence intervals.17  
 
The results are plotted in Figure 5 over different levels of EPLP. Irrespective of the level 
of EPL Temp, the average marginal effect of annual workload fluctuation requires a sufficient 
level of EPLP to become significant. In rigid labor markets, the probability is 8 percentage points 
higher for establishments with annual workload fluctuations. In average regimes such as in 
Finland (with 0.0170 in centered EPLP), these two groups of establishments still differ by 5 
percentage points. In both cases, probability differences between establishment types are 
significant. In flexible labor markets, however, workload fluctuations cease to make a significant 
difference in the probability of hiring temporary workers. 
[[Figure 5 about here]] 
As marginal effects in logistic models depend on covariates, we calculated DP for low 
and high values (one standard deviation difference from the mean) of EPL Temp (Figure 6). Of 
note, we find that the threshold for EPLP, above which DP becomes significantly different from 
                                                
16 Confidence intervals are not presented here, as the significance of the average marginal effect 
of workload fluctuation on the probability to employ temporary workers is presented in Figure 5. 
17 We sometimes refer to the average marginal effect as the “difference in the predicted 
probabilities of establishments with annual fluctuation compared to establishments without 
fluctuation.” 
( ) ( )1| 1,   –  1| 0,  ij ijDP P y WF EPL x P y WF EPL x= = = = = = =
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0, is higher if temporary work is strongly regulated. Furthermore, DP is largest if EPL for 
temporary workers is low. This result is quite intuitive: the easier it is to hire temporary workers, 
the more often they are used to circumvent the numerical adjustment to production shocks by 
firing permanent workers. 
[[Figure 6 about here]] 
Overall, we find that the effect of workload fluctuations on establishments’ demand for 
temporary workers depends on EPLP. This finding is in line with the discussed results of 
Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) and Eslava et al. (2014). Although our study evidently differs in 
terms of the dependent and independent variables, institutions change the impact of variations in 
the workload (either sales shocks or expected workload fluctuations) on employment. Our 
findings differ slightly from those of Nunziata and Staffolani (2007), however, who found a 
significant negative impact of recessions on the aggregated share of temporary employment, and 
that EPLP does not substantially change this effect. The divergence from our results should not 
be very surprising. First, the micro-composition of the economy is not accounted for by macro-
data. Second, we use different concepts because we study the impact of expected workload 
fluctuations and not the impact of the current state of the economy. 
[[h3]]Fixed-Term Contract and Temporary Agency Workers 
In this article, temporary workers consist of FTCs and TAWs. We examine the probability of 
employing at least one FTC or TAW in the establishment and present the estimation results  in 
Appendix Table A.2.18 Our focus is again on Model (2). The results are presented in column (2) 
for FTCs and in column (4) for TAWs of Appendix Table A.2.19 
Theoretically, we do not expect strong differences between these two subgroups 
concerning the impact of annual fluctuation at different levels of rigidity. We generally find this 
to be the case. The direct effect of annual workload fluctuation on employing TAWs or FTCs is 
positive and significant in column (2) and column (4). For TAWs, the annual workload effect is 
slightly lower, which may be because FTCs are a much more frequent type of employment. 
Another explanation is that annual workload fluctuations are to some extent foreseeable, which 
                                                
18 EPL FTC and EPL TAW next to EPLP are included in the models (Appendix Table A.2). One 
might be concerned about high correlations between indicators with only 20 countries; however, 
correlations seem relatively modest between EPLP and EPL FTC (0.31) or EPL TAW (0.43). 
19 Results (available by request) are robust for excluding TAW and FTC as independent 
variables. See the Robustness Analyses section for more information. 
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makes it easier to hire on FTCs at the appropriate time (when they are most needed). TAWs 
might be more relevant in the case of unforeseeable fluctuations, because the recruitment is 
sourced out to agencies. As expected, we do not find strong and robust effects for weekly and 
daily fluctuation. 
We are mainly interested in the marginal effect of workload fluctuations in different 
institutional contexts. We expect the impact of annual fluctuation to differ at varying levels of 
rigidity—and this is what we find. The probabilities of using TAWs or FTCs are significantly 
higher for establishments with annual workload fluctuations, given sufficiently strong EPLP20 
(Figures 7 and 8). We find that the estimates are quite robust across these subgroups for different 
levels of EPL TAW and EPL FTC, but the results seem to be more strongly driven by FTCs than 
by TAWs. Again, this could be explained by the relatively small macroeconomic relevance of 
TAWs.  
[[Figure 7 about here]] 
[[Figure 8 about here]] 
[[h3]]Share of Fixed-Term Workers 
Finally, we use the share of FTCs at the date of the interview as the dependent variable. The 
share of FTCs peaks at 0. Following the approach of using different processes for the extensive 
and intensive margin (Eslava et al. 2014), we estimate a two-component model (a probit model 
and an ordinary least squares [OLS] model for the subsample with values in the group with FTC 
shares larger than zero).21 We find robust and expected relations for the extensive margin (left 
graph in Figure 9), but less robust results for the intensive margin (right graph in Figure 9). 
Establishments in rigid labor markets with annual fluctuations are more likely to employ at least 
one FTC at the date of the interview, compared to establishments without annual fluctuation (left 
graph in Figure 9). This result is not observed in flexible labor markets.  
For the share of FTCs, institutional rigidity does not seem to moderate the effect of 
workload fluctuation (right graph in Figure 9).22 As discussed previously, the non-finding at the 
intensive margin can be explained by the measurement period, the binary nature of the 
explanatory variable, and the recession at the time of the survey. 
                                                
20 Estimation results are shown in Appendix Table A.2. 
21 Estimation results are shown in Appendix Table A.3. 
22 This outcome is independent of whether we control for establishment weights. Results with 
establishment weights are available upon request. 
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[[Figure 9 about here]] 
[[h2]]Endogeneity 
In summary, establishments facing annual fluctuations are more likely to employ temporary 
workers, and this likelihood increases with the presence of EPLP. But, to what extent can we talk 
about causal relationships? Our identifying assumption is that workload fluctuation and EPLP 
are exogenous to the hiring behavior of establishments. Given that our empirical identification is 
relatively weak, we now discuss to what extent our estimators can be interpreted as effects rather 
than as correlations. We discuss three issues: endogeneity of workload fluctuations, endogeneity 
of EPLP, and omitted unobservables at the country level. 
[[h3]]Endogeneity of Workload Fluctuations 
We assume that workload fluctuations are exogenous to hiring decisions and interpret them as 
characteristic of the establishment’s product or as induced by macroeconomic variations. 
Regarding product characteristics, the workload in restaurants, for instance, fluctuates with peaks 
in the summer, whereas retail stores face peaks before Christmas. The establishment could invest 
in other products, although this might be more costly compared to adjusting hiring and firing 
decisions. Therefore, product characteristics and workload fluctuations should be causally prior 
to hiring decisions. 
Regarding macroeconomic variations, reverse causality might be an issue. Recent 
matching models (e.g., Costain, Jimeno, and Thomas 2010; Sala, Silca, and Toledo 2012) 
showed that high shares of temporary workers yield higher employment volatility, a condition 
that may  jeopardize private domestic demand. Increased volatility in private domestic demand 
produces, in turn, more workload volatility at the firm level (at least for firms producing for the 
domestic sector). To assess the potential relevance of this mechanism, Figure 10 shows the share 
of establishments employing at least one temporary worker by sector. The highest shares are 
observed in the sectors of education (M); other community, social, and personal services (O); 
health and social work (N); and public administration (L).23 Domestic private demand might play 
                                                
23 The growing importance of temporary employment, particularly in teaching and care 
occupations, has been documented by a recent collection of comparative case studies (Eichhorst 
and Marx 2015). A similar pattern emerges if shares of temporary workers in the sectoral 
workforces are analyzed. In 2007 data for the EU-28 (obtainable upon request), these sectors 
were in the group with relatively high shares. Note that their high ranking in our establishment-
level data is presumably biased by the fact that large public organizations are overrepresented in 
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a role for sectors N and M. All four sectors, however, are to some extent publicly provided, and 
private domestic demand arguably plays a limited role. Therefore, the use of temporary workers 
is not restricted to private domestic demand, and concerns about reverse causality are weakened 
(but such an effect cannot be ruled out). 
In addition, the notion that workload variations determine the hiring of temporary 
workers (rather than the other way around) is supported by Lotti and Viviano (2012) and 
Houseman (2001). Lotti and Viviano (2012) showed that the positive relationship between 
uncertainty of product demand as a covariate and the share of temporary employment in the 
workforce remains if uncertainty is lagged over more than one year. Houseman (2001) found in 
her survey that the main motive to employ temporary workers in U.S. establishments is expected 
variation in the workload (40% on average). Overall, we do not rule out reverse causality, but it 
seems to be of limited relevance in our case. We account for this issue by interpreting the 
positive effect of workload fluctuation on temporary employment as an upper bound of the true 
effect. 
[[Figure 10 about here]] 
[[h3]]Endogeneity of EPL for Permanent Workers 
Because we do not employ exogenous variation in EPLP to test its role as a moderator, reverse 
causality could be an issue. Reverse causality means that the hiring behavior of establishments 
would have an effect on EPLP; —however, we argue that plausible reverse causality would 
actually support our arguments. First, Marx (2012) has shown for France that changing hiring 
behavior of employers (an increase in hiring of temporary workers) facilitated the political 
process of deregulating EPL for temporary workers. If a similar mechanism would lead to a 
deregulation of EPLP, it would be negatively correlated to the employment of temporary 
workers. Similarly, Bentolila, Dolado, and Jimeno (2012) pointed to the relationship between the 
share of “outsiders” in a country and reforms in EPLP. The higher the share of temporary 
workers, the higher the share of outsiders, who are assumed to benefit (or at least not suffer) 
from lower EPLP. Therefore, liberalizing reforms are more likely if the share of temporary 
workers is high. This condition again implies that our positive estimator between EPLP and the 
employment of temporary workers suffers from a downward bias. In sum, any theoretically 
                                                                                                                                                       
these sectors (which, given their size, naturally have a higher chance to employ at least one 
temporary worker compared to some of the small firms in construction or hospitality services).  
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plausible reverse causality between hiring temporary workers and EPLP would suggest that that 
our estimator provides the lower bound of the true effect. EPLP is a highly path-dependent 
institution, however, with few changes over the past decades (Boeri 2011), and Spain clearly is 
the exception in that regard. This institutional resilience makes a strong pattern of reverse 
causation unlikely. 
[[h3]]Omitted Variables at the Country Level 
To better account for unobserved heterogeneity at the country level, we control for relevant other 
factors. One problem might be that EPLP is often negatively correlated with EPL Temp, which 
in turn is negatively related to the employment of temporary workers. Therefore, we include the 
interaction between workload fluctuation and EPL Temp in our regressions. This approach rules 
out the possibility that the increase in the effect of workload fluctuation with EPLP is driven by 
low levels of EPL Temp.  
[[h2]]Robustness Analyses 
Our results for annual workload fluctuation and its interaction term with EPLP are quite robust 
across various sensitivity checks (including models accounting for the differential enforcement 
of EPLP, different country subsamples, different years of observation, and different 
specifications of the relevant EPL measure).24 
[[h3]]Differential Enforcement of EPLP 
EPLP might be differentially enforced. First, more than half of the countries in our sample have 
some kind of exemptions for small firms (Venn 2009).25 Controlling for establishment size 
dummies in column (2) of Table 3 does not account for this. Hence, we estimate the specification 
from column (2) in Table 3 (without controlling for establishment size dummies) for different 
subsamples, each excluding one establishment size category. No differences in the estimates are 
observed if small establishments are excluded.26 Second, it was found that industrialized and 
developing countries differ in their enforcement of EPL because of governance capacities (Micco 
and Pages 2007; Haltiwanger, Scarpetta, and Schweiger 2014). We therefore use governance 
indicators (government effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption) as proxies for the 
                                                
24 We do not have precise information about the age of the establishment for either the 2009 or 
the 2004–2005 data set. 
25 Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Sweden, and Turkey. 
26 Results are available upon request. 
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enforcement of regulations (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2004; Micco and Pages 2007).27 In 
our sample of developed countries, these indicators have relatively high values. Our results 
(obtainable upon request) show that the relationship does not differ significantly between 
countries with high and low levels of enforcement. We explain this by the fact that, in European 
countries, these indicators show little variation and that enforcement is specifically relevant in 
developing countries (Venn 2009). For instance, Micco and Pages (2007) found that their EPL 
indicator had no effect on job flows in countries with low scores on the rule of law indicator. The 
mean in their sample of industrial and developing countries is approximately –0.18, with a 
minimum at –1.27, and the mean in our sample of developed countries is at 1.26, with a 
minimum at 0.13. 
[[h3]]Excluding Countries 
Because our results might be driven by a single country, we provide subgroup estimations. 
Figure 11 presents the average marginal effect of annual workload fluctuation on the probability 
of employing at least one temporary worker, and confidence intervals (based on column (2) in 
Table 3) for subsamples, each excluding one country from the sample. As the plots show, the 
average marginal effect of annual workload fluctuation requires a sufficient level of EPLP in 
every subsample to be significant. Hence, the results are not driven by one specific country.28 
[[Figure 11 about here]] 
[[h3]]Results in the 2004–2005 Data 
The survey for the main analyses was conducted in spring 2009, when most European countries 
experienced a severe economic crisis. Because our results might be sensitive to the downturn, we 
estimate column (2) in Table 3 with establishment data from the 2004–2005 ECS. Figure 12 
shows that the relationship is as expected for temporary workers. Examining FTCs and TAWs 
separately, it becomes evident that the relationship is driven by FTCs and not by TAWs. This 
finding is similar to the results based on the 2009 data.29 The expected relationship is less clear if 
Germany is included. This outcome is unsurprising, given that an extensive deregulation of 
temporary agency work took place in Germany between 2003 and 2006.  
[[Figure 12 about here]] 
                                                
27 A description of the governance indicators can be found in Appendix D. 
28 Results for employing at least one TAW or FTC are similarly robust. 
29 Results of the 2004–2005 ECS are a bit more sensitive to employer weights compared to 
results of the 2009 sample. 
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[[h3]]Alternative Specification of EPL 
Concerning the measurement of EPL, the difference between EPLP and EPL Temp might be the 
more relevant measure rather than EPLP itself (although, as previously mentioned, the two 
indicators measure completely different phenomena and therefore do not provide common scales 
to assess flexibility or adjustment costs). Accepting their difference as a valid measure would 
suggest that establishments in Ireland and the United Kingdom face higher incentives to employ 
temporary workers than do establishments in France. The share of temporary workers in France 
is higher compared to Ireland and the United Kingdom, however, which confirms our argument 
that it is primarily EPLP that matters. Controlling for other institution- and establishment-level 
variables, we do not find the difference between EPL types to be a significant moderator of the 
relationship between workload fluctuations and the probability of employing temporary workers 
(results are obtainable upon request). Hence, even if temporary work is relatively highly 
regulated, temporary workers still are more attractive compared to permanent workers if EPLP is 
high. Although we do not conclude that relative costs have no role to play, in our case they are 
not highly relevant. 
[[h3]]Results by Sectors 
We check whether our results are robust across different sectors, and find that the results are not 
driven by one specific sector (Appendix Figure E.1). Sector-specific estimates are less robust, 
although these estimates partly suffer from a small number of observations (approximately 300). 
(Results are obtainable upon request.) 
[[h1]Conclusions 
Our intention in this article was to analyze the interaction between workload fluctuation and 
employment protection as an element explaining firms’ demand for temporary work in Europe. 
In line with recent theories, we have hypothesized a higher propensity to hire temporary workers 
if a firm is exposed to short-term workload fluctuations, but only if dismissal costs for workers 
with permanent contracts are sufficiently high. 
We constructed a novel data set combining establishment-level variables (for 
approximately 18,000 establishments and up to 20 European countries) with institutional 
variables for 2004–2005 and 2009. Using pooled, cross-country establishment data, we were able 
to confirm our hypothesis across a number of robustness checks. Establishments with expected 
workload fluctuation within a year are more likely to hire workers on temporary contracts, and 
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this effect is conditional upon a certain level of EPLP (our measure for firing costs). The results 
are not only statistically significant but they also matter in substantive terms. Although we do not 
observe a significant effect of workload fluctuations in flexible labor markets, the difference 
between establishments with and without fluctuations is 8 percentage points in heavily regulated 
labor markets. This outcome is also true for the employment of FTCs and TAWs, although to a 
lesser extent for the latter. This fact might be explained by the stronger role of FTCs on the 
macro-level in Europe. Another explanation could be that the measure of annual workload 
fluctuations predominantly measures foreseeable fluctuations, whereas TAWs arguably are more 
suitable for coping with unforeseeable fluctuations. 
Generally speaking, our results are in line with previous studies that have shown EPL to 
matter at the macro- or micro-level. We complement these findings by showing that labor market 
institutions moderate the effect of firm characteristics. Further elucidating how the two levels 
interact is a fruitful task for future research. For instance, the effect of national economies’ 
composition by firm type on the share of temporary contracts could be assessed in a macro-
framework. The data for such an assessment are readily available. More difficult, regarding data 
requirements, would be analyzing the links among institutions, establishments, and workers’ 
characteristics. The improved availability of linked employer–employee data sets may make such 
a study possible in the future. More generally, our analysis suffers from various data limitations, 
particularly regarding the dichotomous nature of the dependent and the main explanatory 
variable. Here, too, progress will be conditional upon improved comparative data sources. 
What are the broader implications of our study? Based on our results, we share well-
known concerns that firing costs for permanent workers produce two-tier labor markets. As we 
have shown, such costs encourage the use of temporary contracts for establishments with annual 
workload fluctuations. Furthermore, our results indicate that the need for flexibility is inherent to 
some establishments’ production processes. Reforms ignoring the fundamental role of economic 
volatilities are likely to produce worse economic outcomes. A modest deregulation of EPL—
while being aware of a possible trade-off concerning direct negative effects on well-being 
(Salvatori 2010)—may be justified to make it easier for establishments to cope with productivity 
shocks and to reduce dualism of the labor market. 
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[[h1]]Appendix C 
[[h2]] Description of the Sample 
Comparing the original 2009 ECS with the selected sample, we drop a major share of 
observations (descriptive comparisons of both samples are available upon request). Out of 
27,160 establishments, 73 and 64 establishments have missing values in FTC and TAW, 
respectively, and 142 (210, 201) establishments with missing values in yearly fluctuation 
(weekly, daily). These adjustments leave us with 26,649 establishments. EPL TAW and EPL 
FTC are not available in 2008 for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Croatia, and the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. As a result, we are left with 22,802 observations. 
Furthermore, the variables on temporary employment are not comparable for Spain and Italy 
(Eurofound 2010), which are 1,509 and 1,502 establishments, respectively. Hence, 20 countries 
and 19,791 establishments are left. Excluding the publicly owned establishments leaves 19,711 
observations. Excluding missing values in the other micro-variables further reduces the sample 
to 18,407 observations. The majority of missing values (approximately 1,000) relate to the 
variables on the gender and high-skilled share.  
We are therefore left with only one-third of the original ECS countries, which might 
create concern that the resulting variation of EPL remains sufficient to identify the coefficients. 
Although we are left with only 20 countries, we fortunately do not suffer in terms of variation in 
EPL. The maximum and the minimum of the EPL indicators do not change if the 10 countries 
are dropped. Standard deviation even increases for EPL for permanent workers, EPL for 
temporary workers, and EPL for fixed-term workers. 
In the original 2004–2005 ECS, 21,031 establishments from 21 European countries 
participated. The final sample comprises 17 countries and 17,923 establishments, because the 
OECD EPL indicator for January 2004 was not available for Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg, and 
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Slovenia. After excluding observations with missing values in the relevant variables, the sample 
consists of 17,923 establishments. 
[[Table C.1 here]] 
 
[[h1]]Appendix D 
[[h2]] Governance Indicators 
Three governance indicators of the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. 2004) were chosen to capture 
the degree of enforcement of EPL for permanent workers attributable to differences in 
governance: government effectiveness, rule of law, and control of corruption. They are 
aggregated indicators on perceptions of governance. Government effectiveness as an aggregated 
indicator includes the quality of public service provision, as well as the independence of civil 
services from political pressure and the trustworthiness of the government’s commitment to 
rules. Rule of law is an aggregated measure on the confidence in rules; for instance, the 
enforceability of contracts is included. All three indicators are normally distributed and range 
from around –2.5 to 2.5. 
 
[[h1]]Appendix E 
[[Figure E.1 here]] 
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[[Tables]] 
Table 1. Summary Statistics of Establishment Characteristics (2009) 
Variable Mean SD Min Max Count 
If any temp 0.61 0.49 0 1 18,450 
If any TAW 0.22 0.42 0 1 18,450 
If any FTC 0.53 0.50 0 1 18,450 
Share of FTC 9.80 21.63 0 100 18,036 
If any WF daily 0.32 0.47 0 1 18,450 
If any WF weekly 0.44 0.50 0 1 18,450 
If any WF annual 0.64 0.48 0 1 18,450 
If any freelancer 0.19 0.39 0 1 18,407 
If any works council 0.37 0.48 0 1 18,450 
Number of workers increased 2006 to 2009 0.34 0.47 0 1 18,450 
Number of workers decreased 2006 to 2009 0.22 0.42 0 1 18,450 
If high absenteeism and/or sickness rates 
(absent) 
0.14 0.34 0 1 18,450 
Gender share (centered) 5.59 31.82 –41 59 18,450 
High-skilled share (centered) 0.94 29.70 –24 76 18,450 
If flexible working time schemes 0.57 0.50 0 1 18,450 
Establishment size (1–10) 1.90 1.51 1 10 18,450 
NACE      
Manufacturing and energy (C-E) 0.19 0.39 0 1 18,450 
Construction (F) 0.07 0.26 0 1 18,450 
Wholesale/retail trade, repair of goods (G) 0.19 0.40 0 1 18,450 
Hotels and restaurants (H) 0.04 0.21 0 1 18,450 
Transport and communication (I) 0.05 0.21 0 1 18,450 
Financial intermediation (J) 0.03 0.16 0 1 18,450 
Real estate and business activities (K) 0.13 0.34 0 1 18,450 
Public administration (L) 0.05 0.22 0 1 18,450 
Education (M) 0.10 0.30 0 1 18,450 
33 
Health and social work (N) 0.09 0.29 0 1 18,450 
Other community, social and personal 
services (O) 
0.06 0.24 0 1 18,450 
Source: ECS 2009 (Eurofound 2010a). 
Notes: Descriptive statistics with employer weights. Centered variables are centered based on 
summary statistics of the sample without employer weights. High absenteeism means that an 
establishment encounters a human resource problem related to absenteeism and/or sickness. The 
share of high-skilled means the proportion of employees working in high-skilled jobs that 
usually require an academic degree. The figures are representative for establishments with more 
than 10 employees. In countries, with high shares of establishments below 10 employees, the 
overall share of establishments employing at least one temporary worker would be smaller 
compared to our descriptives. FTC, fixed-term contract worker; NACE, Statistical classification 
of economic activities in the European Community; TAW, temporary agency workers; Temp, 
temporary workers; WF, workload fluctuation. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for Country-Level Variables (2009) 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
EPLP (centered) 0 0.563 –1.193 1.147 
EPL Temp (centered) 0 1.147 –1.940 2.650 
EPL FTC (centered) 0 1.370 –1.663 2.338 
EPL TAW (centered) 0 1.320 –2.213 2.954 
Bargaining coverage rate (centered) 0 30.374 –51.580 37.120 
Unemployment rate (centered) 0 2.079 –3.815 3.785 
N countries 20    
Source: For data sources, see Stylized Facts and Data Sources section in the text. 
Notes: EPL, employment protection legislation; EPLP, EPL for permanent workers; FTC, fixed-
term contract workers; TAW, temporary agency workers; Temp, temporary workers. 
  
35 
Table 3. Workload Fluctuations and Odds Ratios (Logistic Model) of Hiring Temps 
 
If any temporary worker 
Regressor (1) (2) 
WF annual 1.329*** 1.316*** 
 
(6.25) (3.95) 
WF weekly 1.148* 1.198* 
 
(2.07) (2.26) 
WF daily 0.895 0.857* 
 
(–1.94) (–2.16) 
EPLP* WF annual 1.144* 1.283* 
 
(2.13) (2.35) 
EPLP 
 
1.349 
  
(0.9) 
  Establishment variables Yes Yes 
Establishment size fixed effect Yes Yes 
Sectors fixed effect Yes Yes 
Interaction country and establishment variables Yes Yes 
Country fixed effect Yes No 
Country variables No Yes 
   Establishments 18,407 18,407 
Countries 20 20 
LL –8612 –9213 
 Notes: Coefficients are reported as odds ratios and are from logistic regression models with 
clustered standard errors, z-values in parentheses. Continuous variables are centered. Country 
variables: EPL for temporary workers, bargaining coverage, EPLP*bargaining coverage, EPL for 
temporary workers*bargaining coverage, EPLP*EPL for temporary workers, unemployment 
rate. Establishment variables: freelancer, works council, number of workers increased, number of 
workers decreased, high absenteeism and/or sickness rates (i.e., absenteeism and/or sickness 
causes human resource problems), gender share, share of high-skilled workers (i.e., the 
36 
proportion of employees working in high-skilled jobs that usually require an academic degree), 
flexible working time. Interaction between country and establishment variables: WF annual*EPL 
for temporary workers, WF annual*bargaining coverage. Establishment-level variables described 
in Table 1. Country-level variables described in Table 2. EPL, employment protection 
legislation; EPLP, EPL for permanent workers; Temp, temporary workers; WF, workload 
fluctuation. 
***Significant at 0.1%; ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%. 
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[[Figures]] 
 
Figure 1. Employment of Temporary and Fixed-Term Contract Workers by European 
Establishments 
  
Source: ECS 2009 (Eurofound 2010a). 
Notes: Descriptive statistics with employer weights. FTC, fixed-term contract workers; TAW, 
temporary agency workers; Temp, temporary workers. 
Country codes: at, Austria; be, Belgium; cz, Czech Republic; de, Germany; dk, Denmark; Ee, 
Estonia; el, Greece; fi, Finland; fr, France; hu, Hungary; ie, Ireland; lu, Luxembourg; nl, 
Netherlands; pl, Poland; pt, Portugal; se, Sweden; si, Slovenia; sk, Slovakia; tr, Turkey; uk, 
United Kindgdom. 
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Figure 2. Workload Fluctuations in Europe 
 
Source: ECS 2009 (Eurofound 2010a). 
Notes: Descriptive statistics with employer weights. 
Country codes: at, Austria; be, Belgium; cz, Czech Republic; de, Germany; dk, Denmark; Ee, 
Estonia; el, Greece; fi, Finland; fr, France; hu, Hungary; ie, Ireland; lu, Luxembourg; nl, 
Netherlands; pl, Poland; pt, Portugal; se, Sweden; si, Slovenia; sk, Slovakia; tr, Turkey; uk, 
United Kindgdom. 
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Figure 3. How Strongly Protected Are European Permanent Workers and Temporary Workers? 
[[AU: possible rephrase:  Employment Protection for European Permanent Workers and 
Temporary Workers]] 
 
Source: EPL 2008 (OECD 2012). 
Notes: EPL, employment protection legislation; EPLP, EPL for permanent workers; EPL Temp, 
EPL for temporary workers. 
Country codes: at, Austria; be, Belgium; cz, Czech Republic; de, Germany; dk, Denmark; Ee, 
Estonia; el, Greece; fi, Finland; fr, France; hu, Hungary; ie, Ireland; lu, Luxembourg; nl, 
Netherlands; pl, Poland; pt, Portugal; se, Sweden; si, Slovenia; sk, Slovakia; tr, Turkey; uk, 
United Kindgdom. 
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[[AU: Journal style prefers a capital letter at the beginning of the label for y axes (and x axes), 
e.g., Probability employing Temps; here and throughout, please update figures.]] 
Figure 4. Do Workload Fluctuations Increase the Probability of Hiring Temps and Does This 
Relationship Become even Stronger with an Increase in EPLP? [[AU: Probability of Hiring 
Temps When Workload Fluctuates ]] 
 
Notes: Average of predicted probabilities, column (2) in Table 3, calculated at 0 for all 
institutions (EPL for temporary workers (Temps), bargaining coverage rate), except EPL 
permanent, EPL permanent is centered. EPL, employment protection legislation; WF, workload 
fluctuations. 
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Figure 5. Does the Positive Relationship of Fluctuation with the Probability of Employing 
Temps Differ Significantly with EPLP?  [[AU: possible rephrase:  EPLP Effect on Probability of 
Employing Temps ]] 
 
Notes: Difference in the predicted probabilities of employing at least one temporary worker by 
establishments with annual fluctuation compared with establishments without fluctuation, 
column (2) in Table 3, calculated at 0 for all institutions (EPL for temporary workers (Temps), 
bargaining coverage rate), except EPL permanent, EPL permanent is centered. 95% confidence 
interval (C.I.) presented with the lower bound (l.b.) and upper bound (u.b.). EPL, employment 
protection legislation. 
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Figure 6. Does the Positive Relationship of Fluctuation with the Probability of Employing 
Temps Differ Significantly with EPLP Even for Different Values of EPL Temporary? [[AU: 
possible rephrase:  Varying EPL Temp Affects Probability of Employing Temps]]  
 
Notes: Difference in the predicted probabilities of employing at least one temporary worker by 
establishments with annual fluctuation compared with establishments without fluctuation, 
column (2) in Table 3, calculated at 0 for all institutions (bargaining coverage rate), except EPL 
permanent and EPL for temporary workers (Temps) (+/– one standard deviation from 0), EPL 
permanent and EPL for temporary workers is centered. 95% confidence interval (C.I.) presented 
with the lower bound (l.b.) and upper bound (u.b.). EPL, employment protection legislation. 
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Figure 7. Do Workload Fluctuations Increase the Probability of Hiring FTCs (or TAWs) and 
Does This Relationship become Even Stronger with an Increase in EPLP? [[AU: possible 
rephrase:  Probability of Hiring FTCs (or TAWs) during Workload Fluctuations as EPLP 
Increases ]] 
 
Notes: Predicted probabilities of employing at least one TAW/FTC by establishments with 
annual fluctuation compared with establishments without fluctuation, columns (2) and (4) in 
Appendix Table A.2, calculated at 0 for all institutions (bargaining coverage rate, EPL for fixed-
term contract (FTC) workers, EPL for temporary agency workers (TAW)), except EPL 
permanent, EPL permanent is centered. EPL, employment protection legislation. 
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Figure 8. Effect of EPLP on the Positive Relationship of Fluctuation with the Probability of 
Employing FTCs (or TAWs) 
 
Notes: Difference in the predicted probabilities of employing at least one TAW/FTC by 
establishments with annual fluctuation compared with establishments without fluctuation, 
columns (2) and (4) in Appendix Table A.2, calculated at 0 for all institutions (bargaining 
coverage rate, EPL for fixed-term contract (FTC) workers, EPL for temporary agency workers 
(TAW)), except EPL permanent, EPL permanent is centered. 95% confidence interval (C.I.) 
presented with the lower bound (l.b.) and upper bound (u.b.). EPL, employment protection 
legislation. 
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Figure 9. Relationships of Fluctuation with the Probability and the Share of Employing FTCs at 
the Interview Date Compared with EPLP in 2009 
 
Notes: Difference in the predicted probabilities of employing at least one FTC (graph 1) or FTC 
shares at the date of the interview (graph 2) by establishments with annual fluctuation compared 
with establishments without fluctuation, Model (2) (see Appendix Table A.3) with different 
dependent variables and estimators (graph 1: dummy for employing at least one FTC at the date 
of the interview, probit model; graph 2: share of FTC at the date of the interview for firms with 
at least one FTC, OLS model) without employers’ weight, calculated at 0 for all institutions 
(bargaining coverage rate, EPL for fixed-term contract (FTC) workers), except EPL permanent, 
EPL permanent is centered. 95% confidence interval (C.I.) presented with the lower bound (l.b.) 
and upper bound (u.b.). EPL, employment protection legislation; OLS, ordinary least squares. 
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Figure 10. Share of Establishments’ Employing at Least One Temporary Worker by Sector 
 
 
Source: ECS 2009 (Eurofound 2010a). 
Notes: Descriptive statistics with employer weights. NACE Rev. 1.1: C-E, Manufacturing and 
energy; F, Construction; G, Wholesale and retail trade, repair of goods; H, Hotels and 
restaurants; I, Transport and communication; J, Financial intermediation; K, Real estate and 
business activities; L, Public administration; M, Education; N, Health and social work; O, Other 
community, social, and personal services. NACE, Statistical classification of economic activities 
in the European Community 
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[[AU: I’m concerned the x and y axes labels may be difficult to read with the small point size 
needed to fit all of the graphs in one composite figure. Think about whether it makes sense to 
make one x and one y label that relates to all of the line graphs, or maybe add the labels to the 
key?]] 
Figure 11. Effect of One Specific Country on the Relevance of EPLP for the Relationship of 
Fluctuation with the Probability of Employing Temps in 2009 
 
Notes: Difference in the predicted probabilities of employing at least one temporary worker by 
establishments with annual fluctuation compared with establishments without fluctuation, 
column (2) in Table 3 for different subsamples, calculated at 0 for all institutions (bargaining 
coverage rate, EPL for temporary workers [Temps]), except EPL permanent, EPL permanent is 
centered. Samples exclude the country mentioned in the title. 95% confidence interval (C.I.) 
presented with the lower bound (l.b.) and upper bound (u.b.). EPL, employment protection 
legislation; EPLP, EPL for permanent workers. 
Country codes: at, Austria; be, Belgium; cz, Czech Republic; de, Germany; dk, Denmark; Ee, 
Estonia; el, Greece; fi, Finland; fr, France; hu, Hungary; ie, Ireland; lu, Luxembourg; nl, 
Netherlands; pl, Poland; pt, Portugal; se, Sweden; si, Slovenia; sk, Slovakia; tr, Turkey; uk, 
United Kindgdom. 
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Figure 12. Positive Relationship of Fluctuation with the Probability of Employing Temps (or 
FTCs, TAWs) Compared with EPLP in 2004–2005 
 
Notes: Difference in the predicted probabilities of employing at least one Temp (FTC or TAW) 
by establishments with annual fluctuation compared with establishments without fluctuation, 
Model (2) but with the 2004–2005 sample with employers’ weight, calculated at 0 for all 
institutions (bargaining coverage rate, EPL for temporary workers [Temps], EPL for fixed-term 
contract [FTC] workers, EPL for temporary agency workers [TAW]), except EPL permanent, 
EPL permanent is centered. Sample excludes Germany. 95% confidence interval (C.I.) presented 
with the lower bound (l.b.) and upper bound (u.b.). EPL, employment protection legislation; 
EPLP, EPL for permanent workers. 
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[[Tables Appendix]] 
Table A.1. Workload Fluctuations, Higher Odds Ratios (Logistic Model) of Hiring Temps, and 
an Increase in EPLP 
 
If any temporary worker 
Regressor (1) (2) 
Establishment controls   
WF annual 1.329*** 1.316*** 
 
(6.25) (3.95) 
WF weekly 1.148* 1.198* 
 
(2.07) (2.26) 
WF daily 0.895 0.857* 
 
(–1.94) (–2.16) 
  
   
Freelancer 1.830*** 1.814*** 
 
(7.08) (4.51) 
Works council 1.416*** 1.833*** 
 
(5.1) (3.74) 
Number of workers up 1.305*** 1.350*** 
 
(7.48) (7.14) 
Number of workers down 0.987 1.016 
 
(–0.25) (0.26) 
Absent 1.474*** 1.624*** 
 
(5.87) (5.33) 
Gender share 1.004** 1.004** 
 
(3.06) (3.16) 
High-skilled share 1.001 1 
 
(0.48) (0.05) 
Flexible working time 1.206*** 1.290*** 
 
(3.92) (4.39) 
Interaction between country and establishment controls 
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EPLP*WF annual 1.144* 1.283* 
 (2.13) (2.35) 
EPL Temp*WF annual 1.019 0.946 
 
(0.65) (–0.98) 
Bargaining*WF annual 0.999 0.996 
 
(–0.78) (–1.26) 
Country controls   
EPLP  1.349 
  (0.9) 
Bargaining coverage 
 
0.994 
  
(–0.53) 
EPLP*bargaining 
 
1.016 
  
–1.4 
Unemployment rate 
 
0.859 
  
(–1.45) 
EPL Temp 
 
0.704 
  
(–1.26) 
EPLP*EPL Temp 
 
0.745 
  
(–0.91) 
EPL Temp*bargaining 
 
1.006 
  
–1.45 
   Establishment size fixed effect Yes yes 
Sectors fixed effect Yes yes 
Country fixed effect Yes no 
   Establishments 18,407 18,407 
Countries 20 20 
LL –8612 –9213 
Notes: Coefficients are reported as odds ratios and are from logistic regression models with 
clustered standard errors, z-values in parentheses. Continuous variables are centered. Country 
variables: EPLP, EPL for temporary workers, bargaining coverage, EPLP*bargaining coverage, 
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EPL for temporary workers*bargaining coverage, EPLP*EPL for temporary workers, 
unemployment rate. Establishment variables: WF annual, WF weekly, WF daily, freelancer, 
works council, number of workers increased, number of workers decreased, high absenteeism 
and/or sickness rates (i.e., absenteeism and/or sickness causes human resource problems), gender 
share, share of high-skilled workers (i.e., the proportion of employees working in high-skilled 
jobs that usually require an academic degree), flexible working time. Establishment-level 
variables described in Table 1. Country-level variables described in Table 2. EPL, employment 
protection legislation; EPLP, EPL for permanent workers; Temp, temporary workers; WF, 
workload fluctuation. 
***Significant at 0.1%;** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%. 
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Table A.2. Workload Fluctuations, Higher Odds Ratios (Logistic Model) of Hiring FTCs (or 
TAWs), and  an Increase in EPLP 
 
If any FTC If any TAW 
Regressor (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
Establishment controls       
WF annual 1.316*** 1.319***  1.126* 1.163**  
 
(6.11) (3.73)  (2.07) (3.01)  
WF weekly 1.085 1.137*  1.05 1.116*  
 
(1.44) (2.03)  (1.06) (2.29)  
WF daily 0.968 0.949  0.902 0.861*  
 
(–0.56) (–0.84)  (–1.40) (–1.96)  
      
       
Freelancer 1.596*** 1.603***  1.666*** 1.503***  
 
(6.54) (4.92)  (7.32) (4.43)  
TAW 1.822*** 2.020***  
  
 
 
(5.94) (6.12)  
  
 
FTC 
  
 1.855*** 2.011***  
   
 (5.57) (6.02)  
Works council 1.333*** 1.563***  1.281** 1.504***  
 
(3.31) (3.32)  (2.67) (4.05)  
Number of workers up 1.208*** 1.233***  1.151*** 1.165***  
 
(4.2) (4.51)  (3.6) (3.99)  
Number of workers 
down 0.973 1.028  0.985 0.951  
 
(–0.47) (0.45)  (–0.27) (–0.81)  
Absent 1.346*** 1.454***  1.252*** 1.288**  
 
(5.02) (5.66)  (3.32) (2.79)  
Gender share 1.007*** 1.007***  0.996* 0.995**  
 
(5.64) (6.15)  (–2.54) (–2.99)  
High-skilled share 1.001 1  1.002 1.002  
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(0.4) (0.13)  (1.15) (1.16)  
Flexible working time 1.210*** 1.259***  1.103 1.128*  
 
(5.15) (4.22)  (1.6) (1.98)  
Interaction between 
country and 
establishment 
controls 
  
 
  
 
EPLP*WF annual 1.087 1.181  1.027 1.072  
 (1.16) (1.41)  (0.37) (1.24)  
EPL FTC*WF annual 0.984 0.989  1.031 1.022  
 
(–0.49) (–0.23)  (0.6) (0.42)  
EPL TAW*WF annual 0.999 0.945  1.069 1.091*  
 
(–0.04) (–1.26)  (1.73) (2.47)  
Bargaining*WF annual 0.997 0.994*  0.999 0.997  
 
(–1.95) (–2.14)  (–0.54) (–1.74)  
Country controls       
EPLP  1.515   2.16  
  (1.1)   (1.76)  
Bargaining coverage 
 
0.999  
 
1.030***  
  
(–0.13)  
 
(6.24)  
EPLP*bargaining 
 
1.038**  
 
0.942***  
  
(2.72)  
 
(–3.69)  
Unemployment rate 
 
0.862  
 
1.02  
  
(–1.49)  
 
(0.25)  
EPL FTC 
 
0.976  
 
0.770*  
  
(–0.15)  
 
(–2.27)  
EPL TAW 
 
1.097  
 
0.705**  
  
(0.59)  
 
(–2.74)  
EPLP*EPL FTC 
 
0.589  
 
4.441***  
  
(–1.38)  
 
(3.6)  
EPLP*EPL TAW 
 
0.775  
 
1.268  
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(–1.23)  
 
(1.45)  
EPL FTC*bargaining 
 
1.007  
 
0.997  
  
(1.57)  
 
(–0.87)  
EPL TAW*bargaining 
 
0.996  
 
1.007*  
  
(–1.01)  
 
(2.29)  
   
 
  
 
Establishment size Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Sectors Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
Country dummies Yes No  Yes No  
   
 
  
 
Establishments 18,407 18,407  18,407 18,407  
Countries 20 20  20 20  
LL –9060 –9601  –8340 –8623  
Notes: Coefficients are reported as odds ratios and are from logistic regression models with 
clustered standard errors, z-values in parentheses. Continuous variables are centered. Number of 
workers up means that the number of workers increased; number of workers down means that 
the number of workers decreased; absent means that the level of absenteeism and/or sickness 
causes human resource problems; high-skilled share means the proportion of employees working 
in high-skilled jobs that usually require an academic degree. Establishment-level variables 
described in Table 1. Country-level variables described in Table 2. EPL, employment protection 
legislation; EPLP, EPL for permanent workers; FTC, fixed-term contract workers; TAW, 
temporary agency workers; Temp, temporary workers; WF, workload fluctuation. 
***Significant at 0.1%; ** significant at 1%;* significant at 5%. 
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Table A.3. Do the Relationships of Fluctuation with the Probability and the Share of Employing 
FTCs at the Interview Date Compared with EPLP in 2009 
 If any FTC Share of FTC  
Regressor (1) (2) 
Establishment controls   
WF annual 0.155*** 0.545 
 
(0.0425) (0.483) 
WF weekly 0.0425 –0.601 
 
(0.0345) (0.708) 
WF daily –0.0108 0.868 
 (0.0344) (0.836) 
Freelancer 0.239*** –1.182 
 
(0.0457) (0.987) 
Works council 0.209*** –8.035*** 
 
(0.0650) (1.261) 
Number of workers up 0.136*** 0.901 
 
(0.0275) (0.680) 
Number of workers down –0.0713** 0.153 
 
(0.0352) (0.576) 
Absent 0.222*** 1.155 
 
(0.0423) (0.704) 
Gender share 0.00377*** 0.0267 
 
(0.000712) (0.0158) 
High-skilled share 0.000432 –0.0460** 
 
(0.00112) (0.0173) 
Flexible working time 0.110*** 0.719 
 
(0.0322) (0.695) 
TAW 0.232*** –3.100** 
 (0.0686) (1.282) 
Interaction between country 
and establishment controls  
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EPLP*WF annual 0.0927 –0.672 
 
(0.0649) (0.956) 
EPL FTC*WF annual 0.0116 –0.205 
 
(0.0195) (0.329) 
EPL TAW*WF annual –0.0573*** –0.613** 
 
(0.0192) (0.260) 
Bargaining*WF annual –0.00356** 0.0254 
 (0.00148) (0.0191) 
Country controls   
EPLP 0.0930 0.520 
 
(0.203) (1.823) 
Bargaining coverage –0.000893 –0.0443* 
 
(0.00357) (0.0232) 
EPLP*bargaining 0.0263*** 0.0876 
 
(0.00798) (0.0716) 
Unemployment rate –0.113* 0.524 
 
(0.0586) (0.577) 
EPL FTC –0.0318 –1.764*** 
 
(0.0777) (0.604) 
EPL TAW 0.172** 2.712*** 
 
(0.0868) (0.603) 
EPLP*EPL FTC –0.508** 6.572** 
 
(0.215) (2.641) 
EPLP*EPL TAW –0.0332 0.105 
 
(0.110) (0.863) 
EPL FTC*bargaining 0.00474** –0.00409 
 (0.00227) (0.0196) 
EPL TAW*bargaining –0.00191 –0.0634*** 
 (0.00213) (0.0173) 
   
Firm size fixed effect Yes Yes 
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Sectors fixed effect Yes Yes 
Country fixed effect No No 
   Establishments 17,995 9,095 
Countries 20 20 
R2 and Pseudo R2 0.1346 0.2294 
Notes: Coefficients are reported from a probit regression model (column (1)) and reported from 
an OLS model (column (2)) with clustered standard errors, test statistics in parentheses. 
Continuous variables are centered. Number of workers up means that the number of workers 
increased; number of workers down means that the number of workers decreased; absent means 
that the level of absenteeism and/or sickness causes human resource problems; high-skilled share 
means the proportion of employees working in high-skilled jobs that usually require an academic 
degree. Establishment-level variables described in Table 1. Country-level variables described in 
Table 2. EPL, employment protection legislation; EPLP, EPL for permanent workers; FTC, 
fixed-term contract workers; OLS, ordinary least squares; TAW, temporary agency workers; 
Temp, temporary workers; WF, workload fluctuation. 
***Significant at 0.1%; ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%. 
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Table C.1. ECS Countries Included in the Samples 
Country Included in 2004–2005 Included in 2009 
Austria Yes Yes 
Belgium Yes Yes 
Bulgaria 
  Croatia 
  Cyprus 
  Czech Republic Yes Yes 
Denmark Yes Yes 
Estonia 
 
Yes 
Finland Yes Yes 
France Yes Yes 
Germany Yes Yes 
Greece Yes Yes 
Hungary Yes Yes 
Ireland Yes Yes 
Italy Yes 
 Latvia 
  Lithuania 
  Luxembourg 
 
Yes 
Malta 
  Netherlands Yes Yes 
Poland Yes Yes 
Portugal Yes Yes 
Romania 
  Slovakia 
 
Yes 
Slovenia 
 
Yes 
Spain Yes 
 Sweden Yes Yes 
Turkey 
 
Yes 
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United Kingdom Yes Yes 
FYR of Macedonia 
   
 
[[Figures Appendix]] 
Figure B.1. Positive Relationship of Fluctuation with the Probability of Employing Temps (or 
FTCs, TAWs) Compared with EPLP in 2009 
 
Notes: Difference in the predicted probabilities of employing at least one Temp (FTC or TAW) 
by establishments with annual fluctuation compared with establishments without fluctuation, 
column (2) in Table 3, columns (2) and (4) in Appendix Table A.2 with employers’ weight, 
calculated at 0 for all institutions (bargaining coverage rate, EPL for temporary workers 
(Temps)), EPL for fixed-term contract (FTC) workers, EPL for temporary agency workers 
(TAW)), except EPL permanent, EPL permanent is centered. 95% confidence interval (C.I.) 
presented with the lower bound (l.b.) and upper bound (u.b.). EPL, employment protection 
legislation; EPLP, EPL for permanent workers. 
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Figure E.1. Positive Relationship of Fluctuation with the Probability of Employing Temps 
Compared with EPLP in 2009 
 
Notes: Difference in the average of predicted probabilities of employing at least one Temp by 
establishments with annual fluctuation compared with establishments without fluctuation, 
column (2) in Table 3 for different subsamples, calculated at 0 for all institutions (bargaining 
coverage rate, EPL for temporary workers (Temps)), except EPL permanent, EPL permanent is 
centered. Samples exclude the sector mentioned in the title. 95% confidence interval (C.I.) 
presented with the lower bound (l.b.) and upper bound (u.b.). High (low) enforcement means 
sample is restricted to firms in countries with governance indicators larger than (smaller or equal 
to) the mean. EPL, employment protection legislation; EPLP, EPL for permanent workers. 
Sector codes: C-E, Manufacturing and energy; F, Construction; G, Wholesale and retail trade, 
repair of goods; H, Hotels and restaurants; I, Transport and communication; J, Financial 
intermediation; K, Real estate and business activities; L, Public administration; M, Education; N, 
Health and social work; O, Other community, social, and personal services. 
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